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the duties of his office throughout the state, while he resides in the same
county in which he was appointed.49
The fact that a notary, in his own county, does not authenticate the
jurat with his official seal in an affidavit will not invalidate the instrument
because the court will take judicial notice of the notaries public in the
county in which the court entertains jurisdiction.50
.No Illinois cases could be found in which an attempt was made to hold
a notary liable to one injured by his negligence or fraud. It is manifest,
however, that grave consequences can result from an improper per-
formance of the notary's functions, especially in regard to deeds. A notary
might be held liable for a false certification in the same way as a certified
public accountant.51 In addition, it might be possible to satisfy a judgment
against him out of the bond52 which every notary must obtain.
The notary and his role in society seem to have been neglected for too
long. A serious study of the situation by legislators and lawyers- is in order.
LABOR UNION DISAFFILIATION-PROBLEM OF CON-
TRACT BAR AND CONTRACT ASSUMPTION
In the comparatively unexplored field of labor relations no more track-
less area can be found than that reached when a union local votes to dis-
affiliate in toto from the parent organization or from the international
during the term of a valid, binding collective bargaining agreement. The
effect of such disaffiliation might be felt on future certification proceed-
ings, or on the rights to the benefits and burdens of the existing contract
between the employer and the local. Will the existing contract act as a
bar to certification proceedings for a new representative? If a new local
should be certified, will that local be forced to assume the existing con-
tract, or may it bargain on its own behalf?
Answers to these questions1 serve as a most fertile ground for labor
litigation today.
Basically, the problems of contract bar and of contract assumption are
.closely allied to the relationship of union to employee. That relationship
may be described either as agent-principal or as third party beneficiary.
The National Labor Relations Board, in attempting to decide the contract
49111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 99, S io.
50 Hertig v. People, 159 Il. 237, 42 N.E. 879 (896); Schaefer v. Kienzel, 123 Ill.
430, i S NE. 164 (i888); Dyer v. Flint, 2l 1. 80 (1859).
51 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 4ti (193).
52 111. Rev. Stat. (195t) c. 99 § 4.
1 Limited to those situations where the local disaffiliates in toto. Also limited to the
problem of contract acting as a bar to certification proceedings, and the necessity of
contract assumption by successor union. For a discussion o property rights upon
disaffiliation see 131 ALR 902 (1941).
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bar or contract assumption issues, is guided by this and other fundamental
considerations.
Among these considerations is the Board's desire to safeguard the rights
of employees to act collectively, and at the same time, to maintain the sta-
bility of existing contracts. 2 To attain these ends the Board strives to
effectuate the intentions of the Labor Management Relations Act.3 Where,
therefore, inconsistencies appear in the cases, recourse to this general
intention may provide a clue as to rationale.
It has been pointed out that the rights of employees to choose repre-
sentatives is nowhere made subject to the existence of a contract.4 In
framing the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Congressional
draftsmen sought to preclude such implication. 5 While it may generally
be said that a valid 6 contract will bar a certification proceeding if it is not
contrary to the provisions of the act, and is with a certified, competent
union,7 this simple rule has been expanded by the current of decisions into
a generalization admitting of great variety and exception.8 These excep-
tions may possibly be rationalized on the ground of effectuating the in-
tentions of the Act.
Although one author has said that "evaluating the Board's development
of the contract-bar rule against its own criterion of steering a course be-
tween stability and flexibility is impossible on an empirical basis... ,"9 yet
it may be possible to develop a norm by which the result of future litiga-
tion can be forecast.
A more precise solution to the certification question, and ultimately to
2New England Transportation Co., i N.L.R.B. 97 (1936); Container Corp. of
America, 6i N.L.R.B. 823 (945); Trailer Co. of America, Vi N.L.R.B. iio6 0943).
3 Conrad, The Contract-Bar-Rule-and Disaffiliation Cases, N.Y.U. 4th Annual Con-
ference on Labor 412 (1951).
4 Rosenfarb, National Labor Policy 773 (1940).
6 In disposing of a proposal to condition certification on contract assumption, a
House committee stated: "Since the inclusion of such a provision might give rise to
an inference that the practice of the Board, with respect to conducting representation
elections while collective bargaining contracts are in effect, should not be continued,
it is omitted from the conference agreement." U.S. Code Congressional Service r 156
('947)-
6Washington-Eljir Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 1165 (1943).
7 Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 309 (943).
8 As evidence of the elasticity of the rule see National Lead Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 182
(1942), where the employees voted unanimously to change national affiliation, with
entire membership wishing to switch, the Board allowing an election, and Yellow
Transit Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 424 (947), where no grievances were processed for four
months, and no meetings for eight months by the contracting union and the Board
held the contract to act as a bar.
*9 Conrad, The Contract-Bar-Rule-and Disaffiliation Cases, N.Y.U. 4th Annual Con-
ference on Labor 453 (95).
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the contract assumption problem, would seem to be presented by an
analysis of the relationship of union to employee in this function.
Broadly speaking, the relationship of bargaining agent to the employee
is that of agent to principal. In Graham v. Southern Ry. Co.10 the court
pointed out that a bargaining agent under the N.L.R.A. "is but an agent
for a principal, and not an independent contractor.... The important
word in this connection is the word 'representatives.' The bargaining
agent is a representative, not an independent contractor.""
The Board has ostensibly refrained from committing itself to either the
agency or the third party beneficiary rule, although it once stated that
"labor organizations are merely the agent of the employees in an appro-
priate unit."12 Recently it has been silent on the question, but an implica-
tion can be drawn that such is still the opinion of the Board from the fact
that it allows, in some cases, the contract to operate as a bar where only
the parent of the local was changed. 13
Ramifications flowing from the theory are readily apparent. If the true
relationship is that of agency, then the contract between the employer
and employee is the property of the employees collectively, with the bene-
fits and duties therefrom descending upon the membership regardless of
the affiliation of the group. The principal would remain liable on the con-
tract although a new agent were substituted by :a subsequent election and
designation of bargaining representative.
A cursory glance at the third party beneficiary theory will demonstrate
the implications incident thereto. If the true party to the contract is the
union, and in a subsequent proceeding the union, the bargaining agent,
were changed, one of the parties would no longer be in existence, and a
new contract would seem to be necessary.
This theory might have even more startling results. If the employees
are but third party beneficiaries, and are unable to discharge the union as
bargaining representative, one of the intentions of the act, the right to
guarantee collective action, might well be destroyed. The possibility of
domination by unscrupulous leaders is possible, since the employees would
be deprived of the right of discharge. With the advent of the require-
ments of non-Communist affidavits by union leaders, the employees, for
10 74 F. Supp. 663 (D.C., 1947).
11 Referring to Sec. 7, N.L.R.A. which provided: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing ... " 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29
U.S.C.A. S 157 (1947). Pertinent provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act
are identical. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (947).
12 Mill B., Inc., 40 N.L.R.B. 346 (1942).
13 Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 89 N.L.R.B. No. 25, z5 L.R.R.M. 1538
(1950).
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example, might find themselves shackled to those who refuse to file such
affidavits, and thus be deprived of the right to the facilities of the Board.
The adherence to this theory would be a drastic curtailment of the flexi-
bility sought to be protected~by the act and the Board.
The agency doctrine,14 however, has the flexibility desired because
when the employees become dissatisfied with their representatives, they
may, under this doctrine, by appropriate vote disaffiliate themselves and
choose another body to represent them. Since frequently the contract is
redenred unenforceable by such disaffiliation, an essential requirement
would be that the dissatisfaction of the employees be bona fide, and not
merely for the purpose of escaping from liability on the contract.' 5
If the agency theory is thus tested against the facts of total disaffiliation
with which we are concerned, the application of the rule would follow in
proper order. In looking at the disaffiliation, the Board would first decide
if the dispute of the employees and the resulting disaffiliation was bona
fide. If such was found to be the fact, the next query would be as to the
exact change effected. If the only change were in the name of the local,
with the officers remaining the same, there can be little doubt that the con-
tract should act as a bar.16 This holding should likewise extend to those
cases where the officers and name might be changed, the membership re-
maining the same. Thus the flexibility of union choice is guaranteed as
well as the stability of contract. Where, however, upon total disaffiliation
of the local, the subsequent certification petition is submitted by substan-
tially the same employees but in a different -bargaining unit, then the doc-
trine of the Board that confusion as to the agent 17 should operate to allow
future certification would seem to be consonant with logic and the safe-
guard of rights desired by both management and labor. It must be remem-
14 It must be noted that the theory of agency relationship is limited to the negoti-
ation of the contract. The theory must break down when applied to the status after
the execution of the contract, and also in the problem of enforcement of the contract
by the members. The fault lies not with the bargaining machinery, but with the
attempt to utilize common law principles which conflict with the situation of a statu-
torily created conflict. '
15 Trailer Co. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. i io6 (1943).
16 See Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 303 (1949); Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Co., 89 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 25 L.R.R.M. 1538 (195o) for cases in
which the existing contract acted as a bar where the parent of the petitioning union
changed affiliations. The Board pointed out that the structure, functions and member-
ship of the local was unchanged, and thus there was no need for certification pro-
ceedings.
17 "It is apparent that the normal bargaining relationship between the employer and
the heretofore exclusive bargaining representative of its employees has become a mat-
ter of such confusion ... that the relationship between them no longer can be said to
promote stability in industrial relations." Boston Machine Works, 89 N.L.R.B. No. 17,
25 L.R.R.M. 15o8 (1950).
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bered, however, that the total disaffiliation must be the result of formalized
action, or this schism' s rule will not apply.' 9
By adopting such a simple solution, the Board would be solving the
contract bar problem, and simultaneously providing the groundwork on
the issue of assumption of the contract in the case of a new certification.
In the field of contract assumption, the few cases immediately con-
cerned with the problem give little aid in its solution. The attitude of the
Board in these few cases has been that it will not decide the question of
successor assumption in a representation proceeding.2 0 In two cases 1 the
Board stated that where, under special circumstances, the two contending
unions had agreed between themselves that the winner of the certification
proceedings would assume the existing contract, that such election would
be solely for the purpose of deciding who should assume the contract.
Insofar as these cases tended to solve the problem of contract assumption,
the Board expressly overruled them in the Boston Machine Works case.22
A hint of Board policy in this respect may, however, be derived from the
Board's decisions that if enough remains of the bargaining unit to effec-
tually execute the contract, an election should be barred.23
Applying with equal force to this problem of contract assumption is the
agency doctrine as discussed in relation to the contract bar rule.
Where the bargaining agent is the same except for minor changes in
name or officers, the union designated as successor should be required to
assume the existing contract on the theory that he principal remains the
same while only the agent has changed. If, however, the bargaining unit
itself has changed in regard to the types of employees to be covered by
the bargaining unit, then the original parties to the contract are no longer
in existence, and the successor union should be free to bargain for its own
contract.
Militating against the theory that there should be a bargaining for a new
contract is the idea that once employees are bound to a valid bargaining
agreement, they should be forced to adhere to this contract and not be
allowed to evade its duties under the guise of changing affiliation. Answers
to such arguments are the basic reasons behind labor legislation: to guar-
Is In J. J. Tourek Mfg. Co., 9o N.L.R.B. No. 4, 76 L.R.R.M. 1168 (i95o) schism was
defined as "formalized collective action at a union meeting."
19Morrison Telex Inc., go N.L.R.B. No. 43, 26 L.R.R.M. 198 (1950) ; Columbia
River Salmon and Tuna Packers Assn., 9i N.L.R.B. No. .22, 27 L.R.R.M. 1o25 (1950).
20 Boston Machine Works, 89 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2S L.R.R.M. i o8 (95o).
21 Register and Tribune Co., 6o N.L.R.B. 36o (i94t); Harbison-Walker Refactories
Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1942).
22 89 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 25 L.R.R.M. 15o8 (195o).
23 Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 44 N.L.R.B. 70 (1942).
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antee to workers the right to freely choose their representatives.2 4 If this
right is to be guaranteed and a new unit as well as bargaining agent is
certified, then practical sense would require a new bargaining contract
since the impractical situation of attempting to fulfill present contract
duties with an inadaptable unit would seem to cry for relief.
If the Board were to adopt this approach to the question, the difficulty
of cases and possible friction between the contending parties could often
be resolved at a tremendous saving in days lost due to strikes, much money
wasted in contending for these theories, and of great expenses used for the
maintenance of the facilities of the N.L.R.B. The Board would be in a
position to summarily dismiss many petitions on grounds such that the
applicant would be almost certain in 90 cases out of ioo to know the
result of the petition before it was even filed.
24 "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining, and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self organization ..... " 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. S 151 (947).
